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LET THEM EAT CAKE: WHY PUBLIC
PROPRIETORS OF WEDDING GOODS AND
SERVICES MUST EQUALLY SERVE ALL PEOPLE
Labdhi Sheth* & Molly Christ**

I. INTRODUCTION
The United States’ wedding industry has a total market size of
approximately $72 billion.1 Every year, about 6.9 out of every 1,000
individuals has a wedding.2 In June 2015, the United States Supreme
Court granted same-sex couples the right to marry.3 Since then, tens
of thousands of same-sex couples have chosen to declare their love by
becoming legally married.4 However, these couples continue to face
obstacles accessing traditional wedding products and services.
When Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins went to purchase a
wedding cake for their upcoming wedding, the baker, Jack Phillips,
refused to make the couple’s cake, citing religious objections. Craig
and Mullins filed suit against Phillips for violating Colorado’s AntiDiscrimination Act. The case eventually reached the United States
* J.D. Candidate, May 2019, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Public Health,
University of California Berkeley, 2015. Thank you to Molly Christ for inspiring my legal curiosity,
Simona Grossi for the invaluable guidance, and the members of Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
for their teamwork and helpful suggestions. Most importantly, I would like to thank my parents,
Pankaj and Nira Sheth, and my partner, Aditya Desai, for their constant love and support.
** J.D. Candidate, May 2019, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Political Science,
University of California, Los Angeles, 2014. Thank you to Labdhi Sheth for her passion and
prose, Professor Simona Grossi for her thoughtful suggestions, and the members of the Loyola of
Los Angeles Law Review for their hard work. Most importantly, thank you to my parents, Tom
Christ and Mary Kyle McCurdy, for their love and support.
1. Pamela N. Danziger, Will a Booming Economy Bring a Wedding Market Boom? Not
Likely, FORBES (Feb. 17, 2018, 12:33 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/pamdanziger/2018/02/17/will-a-booming-economy-bring-awedding-market-boom-not-likely/#53bf41d34270.
2. Id.
3. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015).
4. Adam P. Romero, Estimates of Marriages of Same-Sex Couples at the Two-Year
Anniversary of Obergefell v. Hodges, WILLIAMS INST., UCLA SCH. L. (June 2017),
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/experts/adam-romero/obergefell-effect/.
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Supreme Court, which found in favor of the baker on the grounds that
Colorado exhibited unconstitutional hostility to Phillips’s case.5 But,
the larger First Amendment issues of free exercise of religion and free
speech remained unresolved.
Since Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission6 was decided, other same-sex couples around the country
have similarly been denied equal enjoyment of wedding products and
services, and new cases have been filed.7 This Comment discusses
how the Supreme Court should address the free exercise of religion
and free speech issues in these newly filed cases, given the likelihood
that the issues will once again be before the Court. In Part II, we
provide the factual and procedural background of Masterpiece
Cakeshop. In Part III, we describe each of the opinions in the case. In
Part IV, we discuss the free exercise of religion and free speech issues
separately.
In our discussion, we conclude that First Amendment protections
should not apply to services rendered in the wedding marketplace—
such as baking a cake. An entire subset of the consumer population
should not be limited in the goods and services they can access for
their wedding. Same-sex couples should be encouraged to fully
participate in one of America’s largest markets.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
Masterpiece Cakeshop in Lakewood, Colorado, is a bake shop
selling a variety of baked goods, including custom-designed cakes for
special events.8 Jack Phillips, an expert baker, has owned and operated

5. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1721–23
(2018).
6. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
7. Joanna Allhands, Allhands: Masterpiece Cakeshop Ruling Makes a Similar Phoenix
Case More Important, AZCENTRAL (June 5, 2018, 2:08 PM),
https://www.azcentral.com/story/opinion/op-ed/joannaallhands/2018/06/04/masterpiececakeshop-ruling-effect-phoenix-brush-nib-case/670170002/; Nathan Heffel, The 3 Court Cases
That Could Pick Up Where Masterpiece Cakeshop Left Off, COLO. PUB. RADIO (June 6, 2018),
http://www.cpr.org/news/story/the-3-court-cases-that-could-pick-up-where-masterpiececakeshop-left-off; Andrew Koppelman, Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Sequel: The Baker Is Back in
Court, AM. PROSPECT (Sept. 11, 2018), https://prospect.org/article/masterpiece-cakeshop-sequelbaker-back-court.
8. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724.
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Masterpiece Cakeshop for twenty-four years.9 Phillips, a devout
Christian, has explained that his “‘main goal in life is to be obedient
to’ Jesus Christ and Christ’s ‘teachings in all aspects of [his] life.’”10
This extends to his work at Masterpiece Cakeshop as well.11 Based on
his Christian beliefs, Phillips believes that marriage is limited to the
union of one man and one woman.12 Throughout his case, Phillips was
represented by several lawyers from the Alliance Defending Freedom,
a conservative Christian organization.13

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1722. Alliance Defending Freedom has more than 3,000 lawyers advocating for
“religious freedom, sanctity of life, and marriage and family.” About Us: Who We Are, ALL.
DEFENDING FREEDOM, https://www.adflegal.org/about-us (last visited Feb. 26, 2019). The
Religious Right has long been a powerful political force. Peter Applebome, Jerry Falwell, Moral
Majority
Founder,
Dies at 73, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2007),
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/16/obituaries/16falwell.html; John Gallagher & Chris Bull,
Perfect Enemies: The Religious Right, the Gay Movement, and the Politics of the 1990s , WASH.
POST (1996), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/style/longterm/books/chap1/perfectenemies.htm; Elizabeth Kolbert, Politicians Find a Window
Into
the
Heart
of
the
Christian
Right,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov. 1, 1995),
https://www.nytimes.com/1995/11/01/us/politicians-find-a-window-into-the-heart-of-thechristian-right.html. Since the movement’s rise to prominence in the 1970s, the Religious Right has
positioned itself as the moral compass of America, advocating that, among other ideals, marriage
be limited to the union of one man and one woman. Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, The Christian
Right Has a New Strategy on Gay Marriage, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Dec. 5, 2017, 6:00 AM),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-christian-right-has-a-new-strategy-on-gay-marriage/. Until
recently, that position generally tracked American public opinion. Id. As public opinion shifted at
the turn of the century, and as states started to legalize same-sex marriage, the Religious Right felt
itself move from a majority position to a minority position. Id. In 2015, the battle was seemingly
over when the Supreme Court ruled same-sex marriage legal. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2584 (2015). The Religious Right is still a powerful political force, but its strategy has changed as
it has adjusted to advocating in the marriage equality era. Katherine Stewart, God’s Red Army, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/02/opinion/midterms-christian-rightelection-day.html?login=smartlock&auth=login-smartlock; Katherine Stewart, The Christian
Right
Adopts a 50-State Strategy, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/20/opinion/christian-right-evangelicals-midterms.html;
Thomson-DeVeaux, supra. In an ironic change of events, opponents of same-sex marriage now
seek their own constitutional protection against what they perceive to be a forced acceptance of
same-sex marriage and discrimination against their sincerely held religious beliefs. Jeremy W.
Peters, Fighting Gay Rights and Abortion with the First Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/22/us/politics/alliance-defending-freedom-gay-rights.html
(“The First Amendment has become the most powerful weapon of social conservatives fighting to
limit the separation of church and state and to roll back laws on same-sex marriage and abortion
rights.”). Specifically, opponents of same-sex marriage who work in businesses associated with the
wedding industry are looking to the federal government to allow them to unequally serve same-sex
couples based on their religious beliefs. Masterpiece Cakeshop is the first legal challenge under
this new argument to reach the Supreme Court.
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In 2012, Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins visited Masterpiece
Cakeshop to order a cake for their upcoming wedding.14 Craig and
Mullins told Phillips that they were interested in ordering a cake for
“our wedding,” but did not mention the design of the cake they
envisioned.15 Phillips immediately refused to make the couple’s
wedding cake.16 Phillips offered to make the couple other types of
baked goods—birthday cakes, shower cakes, cookies, brownies—but
explained that he “do[es not] make cakes for same-sex weddings.”17
Craig and Mullins left the shop empty-handed.18
The couple filed a complaint against Masterpiece Cakeshop and
Phillips with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission (“Commission”),
alleging discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in violation
of the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA).19 CADA in
relevant part provides:
It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful for a person,
directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from, or deny to an
individual or a group, because of disability, race, creed,
color, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, national origin,
or ancestry, the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services,
facilities,
privileges,
advantages,
or
accommodations of a place of public accommodation . . . .20
CADA defines “public accommodation” broadly to include any
“place of business engaged in any sales to the public and any place
offering services . . . to the public.”21
B. Procedural History
Upon the filing of the complaint, the Colorado Civil Rights
Division22 opened an investigation into the claims, ultimately finding
that on multiple occasions Phillips turned away potential customers on
14. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1725–26.
20. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (2018).
21. Id. § 24-34-601(1).
22. The Colorado Civil Rights Division is charged with enforcing Colorado’s antidiscrimination laws in the areas of employment, housing, and public accommodations. Civil Rights
Division – Who We Are | Department of Regulatory Agencies, STATE OF COLO.,
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/dora/civil-rights/who-we-are (last visited Aug. 17, 2019).

(9) 52.2_SHETH&CHRIST (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

LET THEM EAT CAKE

12/3/2019 1:47 AM

215

the basis of their sexual orientation.23 “Based on these findings, the
Division found probable cause that Phillips violated CADA and
referred the case to the Civil Rights Commission.”24
“The Commission found it proper to conduct a formal hearing,
and referred the case to” a Colorado State Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ).25 Phillips raised two constitutional claims: first, that applying
CADA, and thereby requiring him to create a cake for a same-sex
wedding, violated his First Amendment right to free speech and
second, that requiring him to create cakes for same-sex weddings
violated his right to the free exercise of religion.26 The ALJ ruled in
the couple’s favor after reviewing cross-motions for summary
judgment.27
“On May 30, 2014 the seven-member Commission convened
publicly to consider Phillips’ case.”28 During the meeting, some
“commissioners endorsed the view that religious beliefs cannot
legitimately be carried into the public sphere or commercial
domain.”29 “One commissioner suggested that Phillips can believe
‘what he wants to believe,’ but cannot act on his religious beliefs ‘if
he decides to do business in the state,” and a few moments later
reiterated this point stating, “If a businessman wants to do business in
the state and he’s got an issue with the—the law’s impacting his
personal belief system, he needs to look at being able to
compromise.”30 At a subsequent public hearing, another
commissioner made specific reference to, while expanding on, the
previous meeting’s discussion stating:
I would also like to reiterate what we said in the hearing or
the last meeting. Freedom of religion and religion has been
used to justify all kinds of discrimination throughout history,
whether it be slavery, whether it be the holocaust, whether it
be—I mean, we—we can list hundreds of situations where
freedom of religion has been used to justify discrimination.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
30).

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1725.
Id. at 1726.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1729.
Id.
Id. (quoting Transcript of Colorado Civil Rights Commission Meeting, May 30, 2014, 23,
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And to me it is one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric
that people can use to—to use their religion to hurt others.31
The other commissioners did not object to these statements and
the state courts subsequently reviewing the Commission’s decision did
not mention the comments.32
“The Commission affirmed the ALJ’s decision in full . . . [and]
ordered Phillips to ‘cease and desist from discriminating against . . .
same-sex couples by refusing to sell them wedding cakes or any
product [he] would sell to heterosexual couples.’”33 Phillips appealed
the decision to the Colorado Court of Appeals, which affirmed.34 The
Colorado Supreme Court declined to hear the case and the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.35 Phillips again raised his
claims under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment.36
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
In a 7–2 decision, the United States Supreme Court found in favor
of Masterpiece Cakeshop and Phillips.37 Although the Court found in
Phillips’s favor, the decision was narrowly decided and did not resolve
the broader constitutional issues presented by the case.
A. Majority Opinion
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, in which
Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Stephen Breyer, Samuel Alito,
Elena Kagan, and Neil Gorsuch joined.38 The majority acknowledged
the First Amendment issues raised by the case, however, resolution of
the case did not turn on those issues.39 Instead, the majority reversed
the case on narrow grounds after finding the Commission exhibited
hostility towards Phillips’s sincerely held religious beliefs.40
31. Id. (quoting Transcript of Colorado Civil Rights Commission Meeting, July 25, 2014, 11–
12).
32. Id. at 1729–30.
33. Id. at 1726 (third alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Joint Appendix, at 214,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111)).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1727.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1722, 1726, 1732.
38. Id. at 1722.
39. Id. at 1727–29.
40. Id. at 1729.
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The majority found the Commission hostile towards Phillips in
two respects. First, the majority found the commissioner’s comments
during public hearings “inappropriate for a Commission charged with
the solemn responsibility of fair and neutral enforcement of
Colorado’s antidiscrimination law.”41 These comments “cast doubt on
the fairness and impartiality of the Commission’s adjudication of
Phillips’s case.”42
Second, the majority found hostility evident by “the difference in
treatment between Phillips’ case and the cases of other bakers who
objected to a requested cake on the basis of conscience and prevailed
before the Commission.”43 The Commission, the majority explained,
ruled against Phillips in part because “any message the requested
wedding cake [carried] would be attributed to the customer, not the
baker.”44 However, this point was not addressed in the other cases of
cakes depicting anti-gay marriage symbolism.45 “In short, the
Commission’s consideration of Phillips’ religious objection did not
accord with its treatment of these other objections.”46
Because Phillips was entitled to, but did not receive, the neutral
and respectful consideration of his claims in all the circumstances of
the case, the Court reversed.47
B. Concurrence—Justice Kagan
Justice Elena Kagan wrote a concurrence in which Justice
Stephen Breyer joined.48 Justice Kagan agreed with the majority
opinion that the Commission did not give Phillips and his religious
objections the kind of “neutral and respectful consideration” to which
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1730.
43. Id. (“On at least three other occasions the [Commission] considered the refusal of bakers
to create cakes with images that conveyed disapproval of same-sex marriage, along with religious
text. Each time, the [Commission] found that the baker acted lawfully in refusing service. It made
these determinations because, in the words of the [Commission], the requested cake included
‘wording and images [the baker] deemed derogatory,’ featured ‘language and images [the baker]
deemed hateful,’ or displayed a message the baker ‘deemed as discriminatory’ . . . . [T]he
[Commission] found no violation of CADA in the other cases . . . .”).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1729, 1732. At the end of the majority opinion, the Court acknowledged that a case
like the one at hand may come before the Court again and that those disputes “must be resolved
with tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and without subjecting gay
persons to indignities when they seek goods and services in an open market.” Id. at 1732.
48. Id. at 1732 (Kagan, J., concurring).
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he was entitled.49 However, she wrote separately because she did not
find the Commission hostile in its disparate consideration of those
bakers who had declined to make cakes bearing messages that
disparaged same-sex marriage because, in her view, that did not
violate CADA.50
CADA makes it unlawful for a place of public accommodation to
deny “full and equal enjoyment” of goods and services based on sexual
orientation.51 The three bakers who declined to make cakes with
homophobic messages did not violate CADA because the bakers
would not have made the requested cakes for any customer.52 In
refusing to bake the cakes, the bakers did not single out the customer
“because of his religion, but instead treated him in the same way they
would have treated anyone else—just as CADA requires.”53 In
contrast, Craig and Mullins requested a wedding cake that Phillips
would have made for a heterosexual couple and, by refusing that
request, Phillips violated CADA’s requirement that customers receive
“the full and equal enjoyment” of public accommodations regardless
of their sexual orientation.54 Justice Kagan concluded that the different
outcomes in the other cases and Phillips’s case could be “justified by
a plain reading and neutral application of Colorado law—untainted by
any bias against a religious belief.”55
C. Concurrence—Justice Gorsuch
Justice Neil Gorsuch joined the opinion in full and wrote
separately to respond to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s dissent and
Justice Kagan’s concurrence.56 Justice Gorsuch recounted the facts of
William Jack’s attempt to purchase cakes bearing messaging against
same-sex couples from three different bakers.57 When the bakers had
refused to make the requested cakes, Jack filed a complaint with the
Commission under CADA.58 The Commission declined to find a
violation, “reasoning that the bakers didn’t deny Mr. Jack service
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id. at 1732–33.
Id. at 1733.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1734 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
Id. at 1734–1735.
Id. at 1735.
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because of his religious faith but because the cakes he sought were
offensive to their own moral convictions.”59 Justice Gorsuch
compared the facts of the two cases.60 Finding no meaningful
distinction in the two complaints to the Commission, Justice Gorsuch
stated that the Commission “presumed that Mr. Phillip [sic] harbored
an intent to discriminate against a protected class in light of the
foreseeable effects of his conduct, but it declined to presume the same
intent in Mr. Jack’s case even though the effects of the bakers’ conduct
were just as foreseeable.”61 He found the Commission did not
neutrally apply CADA because it granted a more generous standard to
a same-sex couple’s petition.62 Furthermore, he did not find that the
Commission had a strong interest in justifying the disparate
treatment.63
Justice Gorsuch also stated that Justice Ginsburg’s specific view
of the facts and Justice Kagan’s general view of the facts created an
arbitrary “Goldilocks rule” where the details of the product description
determine the legal standard.64 Justice Gorsuch found Justice
Ginsburg’s assertion that only cakes with words convey a message to
be irrational.65 Had the bakers been asked to create a cake that
symbolically disparaged same-sex marriage, the bakers likely could
have refused to bake it without the Commission finding a CADA
violation.66 Furthermore, wedding cakes certainly convey a message
of celebration for the marriage and a wedding cake for a same-sex
couple celebrates same-sex marriage.67 Likewise, Justice Gorsuch
found Justice Kagan’s argument that all wedding cakes are the same
to be too general of an assertion.68 An individual’s beliefs must
determine the religious significance of an item such as a wedding cake,
not the government or any judge.69 However, Justice Gorsuch left
59. Id. (citing Joint Appendix at 237, 247, 255–56, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719
(No. 16-111)).
60. Id. at 1735–36. Phillips refused to sell a cake for same-sex marriage to a heterosexual, and
the other bakers refused to sell a cake denigrating homosexuals to atheists. Phillips would sell baked
goods to homosexuals, and the other bakers would sell cakes to the religious customer. Id.
61. Id. at 1736.
62. Id. at 1737.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1737–38.
65. Id. at 1738.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.at 1738–39.
69. Id. at 1739–40.
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open the opportunity for future lawmaking in which a “knowing”
standard can be applied in a neutral manner but joins the Court in
invalidating the Commission’s current decision.70
D. Concurrence—Justice Thomas
Justice Clarence Thomas agreed with the majority opinion that
the Commission’s disparaging treatment of Phillips as compared to the
other bakers sufficed to show hostility.71 Justice Thomas wrote
separately to address Phillips’s freedom of speech claim.72 The
Colorado Court of Appeals described Phillips’s conduct as a refusal to
“design and create a cake to celebrate [a] same-sex wedding.”73 Thus,
Justice Thomas examined what he believed to be the Commission’s
violation of Phillips’s freedom of speech-compelling Phillips to create
a wedding cake that expresses an endorsement of same-sex marriage.74
Justice Thomas discussed public accommodation and free speech
jurisprudence to emphasize the principle that “[a]lthough publicaccommodations laws generally regulate conduct, particular
applications . . . can burden protected speech.”75 Conduct “intended to
be communicative” and, which “in context, would reasonably be
understood by the viewer to be communicative,” qualifies as
sufficiently expressive.76 If the Court concluded that the conduct was
expressive, the Constitution limits the government’s restrictions on
such conduct.77
Justice Thomas believed that “creating and designing custom
wedding cakes” was expressive conduct.78 He detailed Phillips’s
ordering and designing process and described the history of wedding
cakes to support his finding.79 Phillips’s decision to create cakes must

70. Id. at 1740.
71. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
72. Id.
73. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 276 (Colo. App. 2015); see also id.,
at 286 (“designing and selling a wedding cake”); id. at 283 (“refusing to create a wedding cake”).
74. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1740 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
75. Id. at 1741.
76. Id. at 1742 (quoting Clark v. Comty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294
(1984)).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1743.
79. Id. at 1743.
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be expressive, because Phillips routinely forgoes profits to create
cakes in line with his Christian values.80
Justice Thomas also stated that the Colorado Court of Appeals’
decision to compel Phillips in order to enforce the publicaccommodations law was misguided because theoretically any law
could restrict speech under the legislative authority of the
Constitution.81 He stated that the Commission must meet “the most
exacting scrutiny,” because it compelled the action due to the content
of Phillips’s message.82 Although Justice Thomas did not determine
whether CADA survives strict scrutiny, he emphasized that “[s]tates
cannot punish protected speech because some group finds it offensive,
hurtful, stigmatic, unreasonable, or undignified.”83
E. Dissent—Justice Ginsburg
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, with whom Justice Sonia
Sotomayor joined, dissented.84 Justice Ginsburg first stated that the
conduct Phillips faced did not rise to the level of hostility that the
Court has previously found to be a free-exercise violation. She
emphasized the lack of hostility by pointing out that there were four
independent decision-making bodies, of which only one or two
members of one body made comments that the court majority refers to
as hostile.85 Justice Ginsburg believed that the three bakeries that
refused to serve William Jack because of the hateful message he
requested on the cake were not similar to Phillips, who refused to serve
Craig and Mullins a custom wedding cake. In her view, Phillips
refused to sell Craig and Mullins a product because of their sexual
orientation. Phillips refused to serve them a wedding cake, but would
have sold a wedding cake to any heterosexual couple. The good
refused was a wedding cake and, thus, Phillips’s willingness to serve

80. Id. at 1745 (“He is not open on Sundays, he pays his employees a higher-than-average
wage, and he loans them money in times of need. Phillips also refuses to bake cakes containing
alcohol, cakes with racist or homophobic messages, cakes criticizing God, and cakes celebrating
Halloween—even though Halloween is one of the most lucrative seasons for bakeries.”).
81. Id. at 1744.
82. Id. at 1746 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989)).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1748 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg’s main concern with the majority
was the outcome of the case. She stated, “I strongly disagree, however, with the Court’s conclusion
that Craig and Mullins should lose this case.” Id.
85. Id. at 1748, 1751.
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Craig and Mullins any other baked good was irrelevant.86 Justice
Ginsburg believed that the Colorado Court of Appeals held that Craig
and Mullins were denied service based on an aspect of their identity,
while Jack was denied service based on the message he requested on
the cake.87
In a footnote, she also addressed Justice Thomas’s free speech
discussion. 88 She stated there is “no case in which this Court has
suggested the provision of a baked good might be expressive
conduct.”89
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Free Exercise of Religion
Phillips argued “that requiring him to create cakes for same-sex
weddings would violate his right to the free exercise of religion . . .
protected by the First Amendment.”90 The Free Exercise Clause,
enshrined in the First Amendment, provides that “Congress shall make
no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].”91 The Free
Exercise Clause limits the government’s authority to interfere with
religious beliefs and practices.92 The Free Exercise Clause is
incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.93
1. Belief vs. Conduct
Under the First Amendment, freedom to exercise one’s religion
embraces two concepts: freedom to believe, which is absolute, and
freedom to act, which is subject to regulation for society’s
protection.94 If a law regulates an individual’s thought processes or
mental conclusions, then the law is belief-centered and subject to

86. Id. “The cake requested was not a special ‘cake celebrating same-sex marriage.’ It was
simply a wedding cake—one that (like other standard wedding cakes) is suitable for use at samesex and opposite-sex weddings alike.” Id. at 1733 n.* (Kagan, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 1750 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 1748 n.1.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1726 (majority opinion).
91. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
92. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (“Its purpose is to
secure religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil authority. ”).
93. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303
(1940).
94. United States v. Grayson Cty. State Bank, 656 F.2d 1070, 1073 (5th Cir. 1981).
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absolute prohibition under the Free Exercise Clause.95 The leading
case in this context is West Virginia State Board of Education. v.
Barnette.96
In 1942, the West Virginia Board of Education required public
schools to include salutes to the flag and recital of the Pledge of
Allegiance by teachers and students as a mandatory part of school
activities.97 Refusal to salute the flag was regarded as an act of
insubordination.98 This insubordination was punished by expulsion,
and readmission was denied until the student complied.99 Meanwhile,
the expelled student is considered “unlawfully absent” and juvenile
delinquency proceedings could be initiated, and his or her parents
could be subject to prosecution resulting in a fine and jail term.100
Plaintiffs, Jehovah’s Witnesses, sued to enjoin the West Virginia
law, arguing that compelling them to salute the flag and recite the
Pledge violated their First Amendment right to freedom of religion.101
The plaintiffs objected to the compelled flag salute and Pledge as
contravening the Bible’s Exodus, Chapter 20, verses 4 and 5, which
read: “Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any
likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth
beneath, or that is in the water under the earth; thou shalt not bow
down thyself to them nor serve them.”102 Plaintiffs considered the flag
an “image” within this command and for this reason refused to salute
it.103
The Supreme Court overruled its previous decision in Minersville
School District v. Gobitis,104 holding that compelling public school
children to salute the flag was an unconstitutional violation of their
First Amendment right to freedom of religion.105 Although saluting
the flag and reciting the Pledge is seemingly conduct rather than belief,
the Court interpreted the state law as compelling an affirmation of

95. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633–34 (1943).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 626.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 629.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 629–30.
102. Id. at 629 (quoting Exodus 20:4–5).
103. Id.
104. 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (upholding a mandatory flag salute against First and Fourteenth
Amendment challenge).
105. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
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belief.106 The First Amendment cannot enforce a unanimity of opinion
on any topic.107 Because the government cannot force an individual to
affirm or disavow a belief, if a law is found to be directed at belief, it
is deemed unconstitutional, regardless of any compelling government
interest. However, the same is not true of laws directed at religiously
motivated conduct.
If a law regulates external actions stemming from an individual’s
belief, then it affects that individual’s religious conduct and is not
subject to absolute prohibition. There are two types of laws that
potentially infringe on religious conduct: laws that purposefully
suppress religious conduct and laws that regulate nonreligious
conduct, but nevertheless burden religious conduct. Depending on the
type of law, a different level of scrutiny applies.
If a law regulates conduct specifically because of the conduct’s
religious nature or because it is engaged in for religious purposes, then
there is a presumption of unconstitutionality and the government must
demonstrate that the law advances a compelling interest through the
least restrictive means possible. In other words, the government must
satisfy strict scrutiny. In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City
of Hialeah,108 the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. (“Church”)
announced plans to establish a Santeria church in Hialeah, Florida.109
In response, the Hialeah city council adopted several ordinances
prohibiting the ritual or sacrificial killing of animals within city limits,
a practice central to the Santeria religion.110 The Church sued to enjoin
enforcement of the ordinances on the ground that the ordinances
violated the Free Exercise Clause.111 The Court held that the
ordinances were not neutral laws of general applicability, but rather
were specifically targeted to suppress exercise of the Santeria
religion.112 Because the ordinances regulated conduct specifically due
to its religious nature, the ordinances had to be justified by a
compelling governmental interest and narrowly tailored to that
interest.113 The ordinances failed to meet the strict scrutiny test
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 631.
Id. at 642.
508 U.S. 520 (1993).
Id. at 525–26.
Id. at 527–28.
Id. at 528.
Id. at 534–38.
Id. at 531–32.
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because they applied exclusively to the church, singling out the
activities of the Santeria faith, and suppressed more religious conduct
than was necessary to achieve their stated ends.114 Thus, if a law
regulates conduct specifically because of the conduct’s religious
nature or because it is engaged in for religious purposes, strict scrutiny
applies. Unless the government can show that the law advances a
compelling state interest through the least restrictive means possible,
the law will be found unconstitutional.
Although religious exercise is generally protected under the First
Amendment, this does not prevent the government from passing
neutral laws that incidentally impact certain religious practices.115
Strict scrutiny does not apply when a law is facially neutral from the
perspective of the Free Exercise Clause, but nonetheless impacts some
conduct of a religious nature. The most important case in this context
is Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon
v. Smith.116 At issue in Smith was an Oregon statute that criminalized
the possession of peyote, a hallucinogenic drug.117 Ingesting peyote
serves a sacramental purpose within the Native American Church.118
Respondents “were fired from their jobs with a drug rehabilitation
organization because they ingested peyote for sacramental purposes at
a ceremony of the Native American Church, of which both [were]
members.”119 Respondents then applied to the Oregon Employment
Division of the Department of Human Resources (“Division”) for
unemployment compensation, but were deemed ineligible for benefits
because they had been discharged for work-related “misconduct.”120
Respondents appealed, challenging the constitutionality of the
statute.121
Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, held that an
individual’s religious beliefs do not “excuse him from compliance
with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free

114. Id. at 542.
115. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (“Laws are made for the government
of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with
practices.”).
116. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
117. Id. at 874.
118. Id. at 903–04 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 874 (majority opinion).
120. Id.
121. See id. at 876.
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to regulate.”122 Allowing exceptions to every state law or regulation
affecting religion “would open the prospect of constitutionally
required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every
conceivable kind.”123 In instances where laws of general applicability
burden religious exercise, state laws need only be tested under the
rational basis review standard.124
Thus, currently, the Supreme Court interprets the Free Exercise
Clause to mean that state governments may not pass laws that directly
target the free exercise of religion without a compelling state interest,
but state governments may pass neutral and generally applicable laws
that indirectly burden religious practices under the less strenuous
rational basis standard.
2. CADA Is a Neutral Law of General Applicability that Incidentally
Burdened Phillips’s Religious Conduct
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court did not decide the case on
the merits and thus never analyzed the case under a Free Exercise
Clause analysis.125 But, had the Court proceeded to the merits, the
analysis should have proceeded as follows.
The law at issue in Masterpiece Cakeshop was the Colorado AntiDiscrimination Act.126 CADA in relevant part provides:
It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful for a person,
directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from, or deny to an
individual or a group, because of disability, race, creed,
color, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, national origin,
or ancestry, the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services,
facilities,
privileges,
advantages,
or
accommodations of a place of public accommodation . . . .127

122. Id. at 878–79.
123. Id. at 888.
124. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993)
(“[T]he general proposition that a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be
justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of
burdening a particular religious practice.”); Am. Family Ass’n v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 365
F.3d 1156, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he general rule is that laws and regulations that incidentally
burden religion do not violate the free exercise clause.”).
125. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723–24
(2018).
126. Id. at 1723.
127. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (2018).
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The question raised is whether CADA regulates religious belief
or conduct and, if it does, whether CADA survive the applicable legal
test. CADA does not regulate religious belief. Unlike Barnette, CADA
does not compel Phillips, or any other individual, to affirm or disavow
a belief. Those who own or operate a place of public accommodation
are not compelled to subscribe to a belief, or disavow their own
beliefs, in order to operate their business in compliance with
CADA.128
After finding that CADA does not regulate belief, the Court
would next need to determine whether CADA regulates religious
conduct, either explicitly or via an incidental burden. “A law [will
lack] facial neutrality if it refers to a religious practice without a
secular meaning discernable from the language [of the law] or
context.”129 On its face, CADA does not refer to any religion, religious
belief, or religious practice and thus is facially neutral.
But, facial neutrality is not determinative—“The [Free Exercise]
Clause ‘forbids subtle departures from neutrality’ and ‘covert
suppression of particular religious beliefs.’”130 The administrative law
judge who heard Phillips’s case “determined that CADA is a ‘valid
and neutral law of general applicability’ and therefore . . . applying it
to Phillips . . . did not violate the Free Exercise Clause.”131 This
determination is correct. This case is even clearer than Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, where
an Oregon law specifically criminalized peyote possession and peyote
ingestion which is itself religious conduct in the Native American
Church.132 Nonetheless, the Court determined that the law in question
was neutral and generally applicable, and only incidentally burdened
the respondents’ religious practice, despite the importance of peyote
in their religion.133 In Phillips’s case, he is a devout Christian. CADA

128. In other words, CADA does not require a business owner to renounce his or her beliefs in
order to operate a public business in the state, nor does CADA require a business owner to subscribe
to a certain belief in order to operate a public business in the state.
129. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 533.
130. Id. at 534 (citations omitted) (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703 (1986); Gillette
v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971)).
131. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1726–27 (quoting Joint Appendix at 214,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111)) (“The Commission affirmed the ALJ’s
decision in full. . . . [T]he Colorado Court of Appeals . . . affirmed the Commission’s legal
determinations and remedial order.”).
132. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or., v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
133. Id. at 872.
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in no way addresses the religious practices of the Christian faith, or
any religious faith. Phillips’s only remaining argument is that CADA
incidentally burdens his Christian faith by requiring him to equally
serve customers whose identity he religiously objects to.
The government can justify this incidental burden by satisfying
the rational basis standard of review: whether the law is rationally
related to a legitimate government interest. In this case, the test is
easily met. The government, here the state of Colorado, has a
legitimate interest in protecting certain classes of persons from
discrimination in the marketplace. Colorado seeks to ensure that
protected persons are not denied equal access to goods and services
based on their identity. CADA is rationally related to that purpose
because it prohibits places of public accommodation from
discriminating against enumerated groups of persons. Should
Phillips’s case return to the Supreme Court, the Court should hold that
Phillips’s Free Exercise Clause rights were not violated.
In addition, the Supreme Court’s public accommodation
precedent also defeats Phillips’s Free Exercise claim.134 Phillips came
before the Court as the proprietor of a storefront bakery selling to the
general public, not as an individual seeking to express himself through
his art or his worship.135 “It is in this role that he is subject to the
antidiscrimination laws, and it is well within a state’s power to rid the
public marketplace of discrimination . . . .”136 CADA “defines ‘public
accommodation’ broadly to include ‘any place of business engaged in
any sales to the public and any place offering services . . . to the
public,’ but excludes ‘a church, synagogue, mosque, or other place
that is principally used for religious purposes.’”137 A bakery, like
Masterpiece Cakeshop, falls squarely within this definition.
134. Brief of Amici Curiae Public Accommodation Law Scholars in Support of Respondents at
2, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111),
2017 WL 5127312, at *2 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250
(1964)) (“[C]ompelling governmental interests in preventing ‘the deprivation of personal dignity
that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments’ outweigh any incidental
burdens on public-facing businesses.”). Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority in Masterpiece
Cakeshop, stated in dicta that “the Court’s precedents make clear that [Phillips], in his capacity as
the owner of a business serving the public, might have his right to the free exercise of religion
limited by generally applicable laws.” Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723–24.
135. Brief of Amici Curiae Public Accommodation Law Scholars in Support of Respondents,
supra note 134, at 2.
136. Id. at 2.
137. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1725 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(1)
(2018)).
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The Supreme Court previously considered the issue of
discrimination in places of public accommodation when the
discrimination is due to a person’s race. In Newman v. Piggie Park
Enterprises, Inc.,138 the Supreme Court unanimously held that a
business owner’s discriminatory conduct towards African American
customers violated Title II of the Civil Rights Act and could not be
excused by a Free Exercise Clause claim.139
The petitioners in Piggie Park brought a class action under Title
II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to enjoin racial discrimination at five
drive-in restaurants and a sandwich shop in South Carolina.140 “The
restaurant, Piggie Park, was owned by Maurice Bessinger, who was
deeply religious and believed that serving Black customers or
contributing to racial intermixing in any way “contravene[d] the will
of God.”141 When African American customers attempted to patronize
the restaurant, Bessinger denied them access.142
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court agreed with the district
court and held that Bessinger’s conduct violated Title II and that
requiring Bessinger to comply with Title II and equally serve African
Americans did not violate his rights under the Free Exercise Clause.143
“[F]ree exercise of one’s beliefs, . . . distinguished from the absolute
right to a belief, . . . is subject to regulation when religious acts require
accommodation to society.”144
Like Piggie Park, Phillips’s right to freely exercise his religion
“must yield to an otherwise valid exercise of state power.”145 The facts
of Piggie Park are similar to those of Masterpiece Cakeshop, the main
difference being the class of persons discriminated against. Although
the protected class is different, the fundamental principle remains the
same.146 In Piggie Park, a protected class of persons (African
138. (Piggie Park), 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
139. Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. in Support of
Respondents at 3, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719
(2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 5127302 (citing Piggie Park, 390 U.S. at 402–03).
140. Piggie Park, 390 U.S. at 400.
141. Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. in Support of
Respondents, supra note 139, at 3 (alteration in original).
142. Id.
143. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 256 F. Supp. 941, 944–45 (D.S.C. 1966).
144. Id. at 945.
145. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 (2018).
146. Like African Americans, homosexuals have long faced discrimination based on an
immutable characteristic. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015) (“For much of the
20th century . . . homosexuality was treated as an illness. When the American Psychiatric
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American customers) sought the same access to the restaurant goods
and services Bessinger provided to white customers. In Masterpiece
Cakeshop, a protected class of persons (same-sex couples) sought the
same access to the baked goods and services Phillips provided to
heterosexual couples. And, like Bessinger, Phillips’s claim that the
laws mandate that he equally serve same-sex couples contravenes his
sincerely held religious beliefs. Because the facts and situation
between these two cases are nearly identical, the conclusion reached
in Piggie Park must also be applied to Masterpiece Cakeshop. But, to
rule otherwise, and thereby ignore precedent, would sanction
discrimination against not only sexual orientation, but other protected
classes based on religious belief (i.e. race, religion, national origin).147
Masterpiece Cakeshop operates as a place of public
accommodation, open to all who seek its goods and services. Jack
Phillips, in his role as business owner and operator, cannot refuse to
equally provide goods and services to those patronizing his bakery
based on his religious beliefs. Compliance with the law does not yield
to Phillips’s sincerely held religious beliefs. As Justice Kennedy stated
in Obergefell v. Hodges,148 “They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of
the law. The Constitution grants them that right.”149

Association published the first Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders in 1952,
homosexuality was classified as a mental disorder, a position adhered to until 1973. Only in more
recent years have psychiatrists and others recognized that sexual orientation is both a normal
expression of human sexuality and immutable.”). In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, noted that injustice long experienced by a group of people may not be rectified until well
beyond the time when much discrimination has been felt. Id. at 2598 (“The nature of injustice is
that we may not always see it in our own times. The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its
dimensions, and so they entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the right of all persons
to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning. When new insight reveals discord between the
Constitution’s central protections and a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be
addressed.”).
147. Additionally, an exception to CADA would lead to a slippery slope of discrimination.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, said as much in his opinion. While “[t]he First
Amendment ensures that religious organizations and persons are given certain protections, . . . it is
a general rule that . . . business owners and other actors in the economy and in society [may not]
deny protected persons equal access to goods and services under a neutral and generally applicable
public accommodations law.” If the door is opened to allow purveyors of goods and services in the
wedding industry to deny gay persons equal access to those goods and services, “a communitywide stigma” would result and would be wholly “inconsistent with the history and dynamics of
civil rights laws.” Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1727.
148. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
149. Id. at 2608.
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B. Free Speech
In addition to his Free Exercise of Religion argument, Phillips
claimed that the Commission violated his right to free of speech by
compelling him to create his baked masterpieces. He claimed using his
“artistic skills to make an expressive statement, a wedding
endorsement in his own voice and of his own creation” had “a
significant First Amendment speech component.”150 The First
Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech . . . .”151 The Supreme Court adopted a framework
to analyze free speech claims. Typically, the Court first determines
whether the conduct is speech and then applies a level of scrutiny to
the government’s action based on whether that restriction is contentbased or content-neutral.152
1. Baking a Cake Is Not Expressive Conduct
To resolve the freedom of speech claim, the Court must first
determine whether baking a wedding cake is symbolic speech or a
product in the marketplace. The Supreme Court developed the Free
Speech doctrine by testing the legal bounds on a variety of factual
scenarios. The Free Speech Clause protects one’s individual liberty to
express a message. Expression can be “oral or written or symbolized
by conduct.”153 However, as Justice Thomas stated in his concurrence,
“conduct does not qualify as protected speech simply because ‘the
person engaging in [it] intends thereby to express an idea.’”154 Speech
is “conduct that is intended to be communicative and that, in context,
would reasonably be understood by the viewer to be
communicative.”155
The Court has recognized a variety of conduct as expressive,
including political contributions, nude dancing, wearing a jacket
displaying “Fuck the Draft,” burning the American flag, flying an
upside-down American flag with a taped-on peace sign, wearing a
military uniform, wearing a black armband, conducting a silent sit-in,

150. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1728.
151. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
152. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
153. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
154. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1742 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) (alteration in original) (quoting O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 (1968)).
155. Clark, 468 U.S. at 294.
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refusing to salute the American flag, and flying a plain red flag.156 In
each of those scenarios, the Court found that the actor engaged in
conduct to communicate a message that observers reasonably
understood to be communicative. Conversely, the Court has held that
certain conduct, such as shouting “fire” in a movie theater, mailing
obscene circulars, burning a draft card, or advocating illegal drug use
at a school-sponsored event, is not afforded First Amendment
protection, because although they are intended to communicate,
society has an overriding interest in regulating them.157
Justice Thomas believed that Phillips’s conduct was expressive.
He described Phillips’s cake baking process as “sketching the design
out on paper, choosing the color scheme, creating the frosting and
decorations, baking and sculpting the cake, decorating it, and
delivering it to the wedding.”158 By this standard, a birthday cake
would be the baker’s message of best wishes on the birth of a child,
and an anniversary cake would be the baker’s message celebrating the
couple’s wedding anniversary.
However, the flaw in Justice Thomas’s argument is that the
message is not the baker’s, but the customer’s. The customer chooses
the type of cake, the occasion, the color of the frosting, and the words
on the cake. Thus, the customer’s First Amendment rights are at issue.
The baker is simply paid for a service and no observer reasonably
understands a cake to be the baker’s message.
Justices vary in their opinions on whether cake constitutes speech.
Justice Thomas stated that Phillips believes “a wedding cake
inherently communicates that ‘a wedding has occurred, a marriage has
begun, and the couple should be celebrated.’”159 Justice Gorsuch
stated that wedding cakes certainly convey a message of celebration
for the wedding and a wedding cake for a same-sex couple celebrates

156. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565–66 (1991); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 405–06 (1989); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 406, 409–11 (1974) (per curiam);
Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 62–63 (1970); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505–06 (1969); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141–42 (1966); W. Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633–34 (1934); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S.
359, 361, 369 (1931); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
157. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968);
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
158. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1742 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
159. Id. (quoting Joint Appendix, at 162, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111)).
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same-sex marriage.160 Justice Kagan argued that all wedding cakes are
the same and simply convey a message of celebration for the
wedding.161 Conversely, Justice Ginsburg points out that in no case
has the Court “suggested the provision of a baked good might be
expressive conduct.”162 Justices spent significant time thinking and
writing about what they believe a wedding cake conveys, but this
discussion is irrelevant to the Free Speech issue at hand. If the Justices
cannot understand or discern a communicative message, clearly
selling or baking a cake is not an instance of speech worthy of
constitutional protection.
Justice Thomas, citing a single law review article as his authority,
stated that wedding cakes do communicate a message because “the
cake is ‘so standardised and inevitable a part of getting married that
few ever think to question it,’” and “a whole series of events expected
in the context of a wedding would be impossible without it: an
essential photograph, the cutting, the toast, and the distribution of both
cake and favours at the wedding and afterwards.”163 Again, by this
logic, a wedding florist who creates the bouquet the bride carries down
the aisle, holds throughout the ceremony, and tosses to her bridal party
to symbolically pass on her wishes to the next bride amongst them
should be given freedom of speech protection. Similar arguments can
be made about a wedding planner’s decoration vision or the
musician’s choice in music. While parades, flags, and sit-ins have
traditionally been held as “a form of expression,” wedding cakes have
never been given this level of deference in our jurisprudence. An
individual waving a flag or engaging is a sit-in is communicating his
or her own views, while here, the baker is simply performing a retail
service that reflects the purchaser’s views.
Weddings are inherently emotional and symbolic for a variety of
reasons, but an entire industry’s commercial services cannot be
protectable under the First Amendment. This protection has the
potential to significantly broaden the scope of the Free Speech Clause
to include any service or product with customization. The Court
should be wary of opening the floodgates and establishing that any
160. Id. at 1733 n.* (Kagan, J., concurring).
161. Id. at 1733.
162. Id. at 1748 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 1743 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Simon
Charsley, Interpretation and Custom: The Case of the Wedding Cake, 22 MAN 93, 95 (1987)).
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action could constitute symbolic speech. Allowing businesses to turn
away customers under the guise of free speech could significantly
limit the type and quality of goods and services available to distinct
members of our society in the marketplace. This concern is what gave
rise to Public Accommodation statutes, and thus, free speech attacks
to this important legislation would uproot this essential protection.
Thus, the Court should find that baking a cake is not sufficiently
expressive to trigger application of the First Amendment.
2. Public Accommodation Law Is Content-Neutral
Should the Court find that cake baking is expressive conduct, the
Constitution limits the government’s authority to restrict or compel it.
Restrictions based on the content of speech are valid only if the
government can pass the heightened scrutiny muster. 164 However,
regulations on conduct that prove to be an incidental burden do not
abridge the Freedom of Speech.165 The key case in this context is
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.166
In Sorrell, the Supreme Court held that a Vermont law was
facially a content-based restriction on speech.167 The law prohibited
pharmacies from disclosing information to manufacturers if
manufacturers intended to use that information in marketing.168 The
Court held that the law explicitly barred speech and did not agree with
Vermont’s argument that the law was simply a commercial
regulation.169 The speech restriction, along with other aspects of the
statute, seemed to disfavor marketing and therefore, went “even
beyond mere content discrimination, to actual viewpoint
discrimination.”170 Under these circumstances, heightened scrutiny is
warranted.
Here, CADA does not create a content-based restriction on its
face. It simply disallows discriminatory practices against a person
based on a protected classification. CADA defines “public
accommodation” broadly to include any “place of business engaged in
any sales to the public and any place offering services . . . to the
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011).
Id. at 565.
564 U.S. 552 (2011).
Id. at 563.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 566.
Id. (quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377, 391 (1992)).
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public.”171 The Vermont law in Sorrell disfavored marketing speech
and the actual text of the statute restricted speech in certain
scenarios. 172 In contrast, CADA does not restrict a particular message.
In fact, CADA does not explicitly restrict speech at all. CADA simply
prohibits any public place of business from denying services to a class
of individuals on the basis of their protected status.
The Supreme Court previously discussed public accommodation
law within the First Amendment context in Hurley v. Irish-American
Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.173 In Hurley, the
Massachusetts state court agreed with the petitioners that the state’s
public accommodation law compelled the organizers of a St. Patrick’s
Day parade to include GLIB, an organization celebrating Irish
American gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals.174 However, on
appeal, although the Supreme Court found that a Massachusetts public
accommodation law did not violate the First or Fourteenth
Amendments, the Court held that the state court’s application of the
Massachusetts public accommodations law violated the First
Amendment.175 The public accommodation law “provisions are well
within a legislature’s power to enact when it has reason to believe that
a given group is being discriminated against.”176 And the statute, like
CADA, did not, on its face, target speech or discriminate on the basis
of its content. However, by compelling the organizers of the parade to
include individuals whose message they did not see as their own, the
state court violated the organizers’ rights under the Free Speech
Clause.
In the instant matter, Justice Thomas argued that like Hurley, the
Commission’s application of CADA creates a content-based
restriction. Hence, the statute had more than an incidental burden on
free speech.177 Since the Commission permitted other bakeries to
171. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(1) (2018).
172. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 564.
173. 515 U.S. 557, 572 (1995).
174. Id. at 561–62.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 558.
177. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1741 (2018)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Thomas, citing to Hurley,
seemed to indicate that this scenario is similar to that in Hurley where the public accommodation
was in fact speech—participation in a parade. Id. (quoting Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian
and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. at 573) (“When a public-accommodations law ‘ha[s]
the effect of declaring . . . speech itself to be the public accommodation,’ the First Amendment
applies with full force.”). While it is settled law that participation in a parade is expressive conduct
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refuse service to customers ordering cakes with an anti-LGBTQ
message, but found Phillips in violation of CADA for refusing service
to customers ordering a cake celebrating a same-sex marriage, Justice
Thomas stated that, as applied, CADA restricts speech based on the
message. Justice Thomas thus endorsed the use of heightened scrutiny
and not the content-neutral O’Brien test.178 Justice Thomas stated,
“Colorado would not be punishing Phillips if he refused to create any
custom wedding cakes; it is punishing him because he refuses to create
custom wedding cakes that express approval of same-sex
marriage.”179 Justice Thomas’s viewpoint is not supported by the
underlying facts. Craig and Mullins were refused the sale of any
wedding cake at all and were turned away before any specific cake
design were discussed. In fact, it appeared that Phillips rarely
produced wedding cakes with words on them—or at least did not
advertise such cakes.180 The Commission simply wanted Phillips to
create a wedding cake for this couple as he would for heterosexual
couples. The Commission would likely find Phillips in violation of the
public-accommodation laws if he similarly refused to sell a wedding
cake to an African American couple or an interracial couple.181
Although the Commission’s disparate consideration between the
bakeries may serve as evidence of a content-based restriction in this
circumstance, as a standalone matter, the Commission’s treatment of
Phillips’s actions is not a content-based restriction. In a not-sohypothetical case likely to come before the Supreme Court, where a
state actor prohibits a commercial bakery or any other business from
refusing service to a customer, the Supreme Court should dismiss the
business’s argument that providing a service or selling a good in the
marketplace triggers First Amendment protection. Such arguments

classified as speech, there is significant debate in the law whether or not baking a cake is speech.
See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573. Thus, the Hurley analysis does not apply in this context.
178. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1746 (“Although this Court sometimes reviews
regulations of expressive conduct under the more lenient test articulated in O’Brien, that test does
not apply unless the government would have punished the conduct regardless of its expressive
component.”); see, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566–72 (1991).
179. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1746.
180. Id. at 1751 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Photo Gallery of Wedding Cakes,
MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, http://www.masterpiececakes.com/wedding-cakes (last visited
Mar. 3, 2019)).
181. See generally Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (holding that
the commerce clause extends anti-discrimination provisions in the civil rights act of 1964 to hotels
that host travelers from outside the state).
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will uproot public accommodation laws nationwide and undermine the
rights of the customer.
3. Public Accommodation Law Does Withstand
Heightened Scrutiny
If the Supreme Court were to determine that a government
restriction will be valid only if it passes heightened scrutiny, the
government must then demonstrate a substantial government interest
that is narrowly tailored to fit that interest.182 Here, Colorado’s interest
was allowing a same-sex couple access to full and equal enjoyment of
the goods provided by the bakery. The action was narrowly tailored to
that interest as the Commission simply compelled Phillips to serve the
couple with the same product he served in the normal course of his
business to other members of the public.
The Supreme Court seemed to summarily determine that the
Commission did not pass strict scrutiny because of its alleged hostility
to Phillips’s viewpoint. However, if the Supreme Court addressed the
issue on its merits, it should have found that the Commission’s
decision to compel Phillips to serve Craig and Mullins was narrowly
tailored if the Commission had also enforced the other customers’
rights to purchase cakes with their preferred message. When this
scenario inevitably reaches the Supreme Court again, the Court should
find that a government’s interest in ensuring all consumers have equal
protection in and equal access to the marketplace is strong, and
compelling commercial businesses to serve all regardless of their
identify, as codified in most public accommodation laws, is narrowly
tailored.
V. CONCLUSION
The questions presented in this case are far from resolved. And,
since the resolution of Masterpiece Cakeshop, cases with similar
issues have been filed in many jurisdictions and will continue to make
their way through the courts.183 Inevitably, one of these cases will
demand Supreme Court review and resolution of the unanswered First
Amendment questions. In cases with facts similar to Masterpiece
Cakeshop, finding in favor of the religious business owner would
allow for constitutionally sanctioned discrimination.
182. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
183. Koppelman, supra note 7; Allhands, supra note 7; Heffel, supra note 7.
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In addition to following Supreme Court doctrine, the Court must
consider the larger implications. Although the Court has allowed for
same-sex marriage, restricting access to wedding goods and services
significantly inhibits same-sex couples from fully enjoying their right
to marriage. To rule otherwise would not only harm same-sex couples,
but also enjoin free commerce within the billion-dollar wedding
industry.

